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Abstract
The 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were developed to ‘transform our world’. Yet critics argue that the concept 
of sustainable development serves to maintain an unsustainable status quo, or provide a positive gloss on a terminal conflict 
between its ‘pillars’: environmental protection, economic growth and social welfare. In this article, we examine this ten-
sion with respect to the implementation of SDG 12 in the European Union. SDG 12 calls for responsible consumption and 
production, which necessitates reconciling, or ‘decoupling’, economic growth and environmental degradation: the core of 
sustainable development. Initial examination reveals that the largest implementation gap is among high-consuming coun-
tries, including those of the EU, the focus of our article, who are failing to account for transboundary impacts of products 
consumed domestically. This shortcoming, facilitated by the flexibility of the SDG ‘global target, national action’ approach, 
undermines the achievement of other environmental SDGs relating to biodiversity and climate, among others. Yet, as com-
pared to other EU approaches to addressing transboundary environmental harm from trade in existing Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), which we examine, the global focus and breadth of SDG 12 
offers transformative potential. Ultimately, even if the three pillars of sustainable development are not ‘rebalanced’ toward 
environmental conservation, they can provide a construct for examining interactions and trade-offs between goals. Simply 
taking account of transboundary consumption, as SDG 12 indicators call for, would encourage more effective cooperation 
to help producing countries address environmental problems that result from production for export through impact assess-
ment and enforcement.
Keywords SDGs · SDG 12 · Trade · Transboundary · Impact assessment
Introduction
Despite the growth and increasing interconnectedness of 
global supply chains, wealthy, high-consuming countries 
have neglected to account for transboundary impacts of their 
domestic consumption in the context of SDG 12 on respon-
sible production and consumption (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
SDSN 2018). Whilst this transboundary gap has been docu-
mented both through academic research (see, e.g. Wiedmann 
and Lenzen 2018) and in the High-Level Political Forum 
on Sustainable Development (UN 2017, p 12), analysis of 
existing approaches to take account of transboundary envi-
ronmental harm are often siloed into sectoral or jurisdic-
tional contexts. In this article we take stock of some exist-
ing approaches in both international and EU public law that 
aim to mitigate and address transboundary environmental 
harm that occurs through supply chains. We argue that SDG 
12 provides an opportunity which is largely being missed: 
for governments to address the considerable gaps in these 
current mechanisms, and to account for these harms more 
systematically.
The SDG framework has significant limitations. The 
weak implementation of SDG 12 reflects larger critiques of 
the term ‘sustainable development’ as serving to maintain 
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the status quo, as we document in the first part of this paper. 
Achieving the transformation the SDGs explicitly requires 
Parties to go beyond simply cutting and pasting existing pol-
icies. For SDG 12, reporting on transboundary impacts con-
stitutes transformational implementation, as it motivates and 
informs recognition of the need to redress negative impacts. 
In so doing it builds upon ongoing in the UN context, 
through for example the International Resources Panel, but 
goes further in requiring that governments account for trans-
boundary impacts of domestic consumption systematically.
If implemented fully, the political rather than legal ori-
entation of the SDGs, and their emphasis on reporting 
and information-sharing, provides an opportunity to move 
beyond entrenched debates about the ‘trade and environ-
ment’ relationship that have hampered ambitions in existing 
legal frameworks. For example, in trade fora, notably the 
WTO, developing countries have expressed concern that the 
EU and other developed countries impede export by impos-
ing environmental requirements which act as market access 
barriers (Lydgate 2018). While the concerns raised are 
legitimate, this debate, with its contentious framing, exces-
sively narrows the scope for a collaborative response to an 
environmental problem which contains symbiotic benefits 
and harms for importers (outsourcing environmental harm) 
and exporters (developing export industries).
Arguably, their prevalence and universal participation 
mean that the SDGs provide the most promising avenue for 
addressing the issue of environmental harm through supply 
chains systematically. International environmental law pro-
hibits transboundary harm, but this concept has been con-
strued narrowly as applying only to harm across physical 
borders. EU procedural requirements, such as Sustainability 
Impact Assessment of trade agreements, are promising as an 
approach to increase synergies between SDGs, but are cur-
rently limited in scope and effectiveness. Ultimately, taking 
SDG 12 seriously will help to build a more compelling case 
for strengthening the current piecemeal approach.
SDG 12 and the achievement of ‘sustainable 
development’
Adopted in 2015 with the universal agreement of UN coun-
tries, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) comprise 
the international community’s agenda ‘for people, planet and 
prosperity’. They build on work undertaken through the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2000 in 
an effort ‘to ensure that globalization becomes a positive 
force for all the world’s people’ (MDGs 2000, para. 5). As 
a guide for national and international policymaking until 
2030 (United Nations (UN) 2015, the SDGs comprise a pro-
gramme of 17 goals and 169 sub-targets, covering some of 
the most pressing environmental, economic and social chal-
lenges currently facing the planet.
The SDGs are presented as a plan for ‘transforming our 
world’ (United Nations 2015) towards sustainable develop-
ment. Sustainable development’s high-profile role in inter-
national environmental conferences and policies has helped 
to impel its global prevalence as a conceptual structure for 
environmental problem-solving at many different levels of 
the policy process. Yet, since its inception as an international 
law commitment (World Commission on Environment and 
Development 1987), a large body of academic and policy 
literature has critiqued the concept of sustainable develop-
ment for its lack of transformative power. In international 
environmental law, it is often characterised as having three 
mutually reinforcing pillars: economic development, social 
welfare and environmental protection (World Summit on 
Sustainable Development 2002). Critics have noted that 
its open-ended nature comfortably reinforces a hierarchi-
cal positioning of economic development above its other 
pillars (Beckermann 1994). Some characterise it as simply 
too broad to catalyse specific action (Pardy 2005). More 
radically, it has been described as serving to obscure, and 
thereby prevent the resolution of, a ‘latent collision course’ 
between the pillars it purports to harmonise (Stone 1994, p 
977). More recent critiques of the SDGs have noted that they 
seem to endorse a narrative that environmental and social 
benefits are consequences of economic growth (Kotzé and 
French 2018).
These issues are pertinent in debates concerning the con-
tentious relationship between trade and the environment. 
Trade is an aspect of the economic development pillar of 
sustainable development, with the underlying assumption 
being that ‘trade liberalization leads to greater prosper-
ity, which creates the resources for better environmental 
management and social policies’ (Lydgate 2012a, p 622). 
Increased trade may lead to positive environmental payoffs 
domestically, but unless states implement their domestic 
trade policies in a manner that is sensitive to their external 
environmental footprints, the global agenda for sustainable 
development will be frustrated.
With these critiques in mind, we focus on the imple-
mentation of SDG 12 on responsible consumption and pro-
duction. SDG 12 aims to decouple economic growth from 
resource use and environmental degradation (UN Statistics 
Division 2018): an issue at the heart of sustainable devel-
opment. SDG 12 has one of the greatest implementation 
gaps for wealthy OECD countries, including those of the 
EU (Bertelsmann Stiftung, SDSN 2018). One reason for 
this is that effective implementation requires cooperative 
global action. Much of the impact of domestic consump-
tion in wealthy countries takes place through the depletion 
of natural resources in other, often developing, countries 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, SDSN 2018). Evidence suggests that 
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the consumption/production gap between developed and 
developing countries is continuing to expand (UNEP, Inter-
national Resources Panel 2015). Thus, whilst the respon-
sibility for mitigating natural resource depletion, pollution 
and other negative impacts of producing these goods falls 
within the jurisdiction of producing countries, dispropor-
tionately high levels of consumption in wealthy countries 
makes them increasingly responsible, in practical if not legal 
terms, for environmental damage that occurs outside their 
borders. Yet, concerningly, few developed countries have 
attempted to take account of transboundary trade impacts. 
In its SDG 12 reporting, for example, the EU concludes that 
domestic consumption has reduced, but neglects to account 
for impacts beyond its borders.
The SDG Knowledge Platform itself celebrates that ‘the 
per capita “material footprint” of developing countries grew 
from 5 metric tons in 2000 to 9 metric tons in 2017, rep-
resenting a significant improvement in material standard 
of living’ (SDG Knowledge Platform 2018). This shows 
that the goal of ‘decoupling’ has yet to be fully embraced 
by the international community; increased consumption 
is correlated with improved quality of life, a clash in the 
environmental and social welfare ‘pillars’ of sustainable 
development. This issue is compounded by transboundary 
approaches to efficient resource management risk being con-
frontational rather than cooperative. The peremptory norm 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, enshrined 
in numerous UN General Assembly Resolutions and MEAs, 
severely limits the extent to which a state may be challenged 
if others consider their exploitation of their internal natu-
ral resources to be unsustainable. Furthermore, concerns 
regarding the imposition of trade barriers by the developed 
world continue to influence how developing countries per-
ceive attempts to condition trade and development on eco-
nomic considerations (Lydgate 2018).
Implementation: the global target, national 
action approach
The SDGs largely adopt a ‘global target, national action’ 
(GTNA) approach. This consists of the setting of global 
targets and then encouraging states to take action nation-
ally to contribute towards the achievement of these. The 
targets themselves encompass both best endeavours and 
quantitative commitments. GTNA has notable advantages, 
particularly in the context of such broadscale holistic pol-
icymaking that the SDGs encapsulates. In particular, it 
does not place any constraints, either by demanding cer-
tain actions or proscribing them, on the limited resources 
of states. They remain free to determine the direction and 
pace of their economic and social development. This is 
important in a practical sense; states have very different 
capacities and priorities and so an overly prescriptive 
regime would be inappropriate. It is also important legally, 
as it complies with the sovereignty of the individual nation 
state, one of the most important peremptory norms of 
international law (Kokott 2007).
The problem is that there is little evidence to suggest that 
the GTNA approach works. Its flaws are evident in interna-
tional conservation law. In response to failure of the states 
party to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD 
1992) to ‘achieve by 2010 a significant reduction in the cur-
rent rate of biodiversity loss’ (CBD 2002), a new Strategic 
Plan for Biodiversity, based on 20 targets to be mostly be 
achieved by 2020 (the Aichi Targets), was adopted (CBD 
2010, Annex).
These are global targets to which national action by states 
contributes, rather than specific targets for states themselves 
to achieve. However, a midterm assessment of progress 
towards the Aichi Targets indicated that although some 
progress had been made, ‘in most cases this progress will 
not be sufficient to achieve the targets set for 2020’ (Secre-
tariat to the Convention on Biological Diversity 2014, p 10). 
Arguably such efforts have not been made, evidenced by the 
catalogue of recent reports showing that biodiversity con-
tinues to decline (for example, WWF/ZSL 2016 and RBG 
Kew 2016).
The GTNA approach has since been adopted in other 
areas of international environmental law. A notable example 
is the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) of emis-
sions reductions that are the central mechanism in Article 4 
of the 2015 Paris Agreement. In short, states set their own 
emission reduction targets and the combined effect of these 
is intended to achieve the global target, contained in Article 
2, of limiting the global temperature rise to below 2 °C. This 
flexibility is a marked departure from the more proscriptive 
approach taken by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which has met 
with increasing criticism since its adoption (Doelle 2016).
At the time it was negotiated, the Paris Agreement was 
considered a major success (Bodle et al. 2016). However, 
it is important not to conflate an agreement that is ‘good’ 
because it was endorsed by a majority of states with an 
agreement that is ‘good’ because it is sufficiently robust so 
as to be capable ofachieving its stated objectives. The initial 
set of NDCs fall far below what is needed to achieve even 
the 2 °C goal (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
2018).
The breadth and indicator-driven nature of the SDG s 
likely serves to push implementing states toward prioritising 
data-collection and reporting as a means to fulfil their SDG 
treaty obligations. However, within this context, the ambi-
tion of the approach that countries can take varies greatly. 
On the more ambitious end, countries can use the SDGs to 
inform and guide national policymaking through the coun-
try-specific indicators. Germany has gone further than most 
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in developing a series of indicators and targets pertinent to 
domestic circumstances to help guide national policymak-
ing. For example (Table 1).
Similar indicators and targets have been developed for 
the other SDGs as well (German Federal Government 2016, 
pp 239–242).
Less ambitious is what may be described as a ‘cut and 
paste’ approach, with states taking pre-existing policies and 
superimposing these on top of the SDGs. This can be seen 
in the UK. The website detailing its SDG implementation 
provides links to a few government resources relevant to 
the SDG in question, in many cases the Industrial Strat-
egy.1 The Industrial Strategy cuts across a range of sectors 
and could be an effective means of delivering the holistic 
approach to policymaking that is necessary if the SDGs are 
to be achieved. However, that the Strategy does not mention 
the SDGs at all allows us to question whether it is a serious 
attempt to deliver the global agenda for sustainable develop-
ment or just being used by the Government to superficially 
meet its commitments under the SDGs.
Both approaches must be considered legitimate ways for 
states to implement the SDGs, whatever their flaws, as states 
are afforded complete discretion in choosing how to do so. 
Neither should they be seen as mutually exclusive and states 
often incorporate elements of each. The UK, for example, 
may currently only make oblique references to policy docu-
ments, but the Office for National Statistics is collating data 
on the SDG indicators so that they can be used to inform 
decision-making in the future (Office of National Statistics 
2017). However, the targeted approach taken by Germany 
is clearly preferable in demonstrating that SDGs are trans-
formative, rather than simply an auditing exercise.
SDG 12 implementation
With respect to the approaches outlined above, initial report-
ing on SDG 12, which calls for ‘responsible consumption 
and production’, reveals that ‘cut and paste’ approaches are 
prevalent. Most notably, few have developed robust, SDG 
12-specific indicators. Thus, the whole systems approach 
believed critical for the success of the SDGs has yet to be 
adopted (UNEP, International Resource Panel 2017). SDG 
12 sub-indicators call for accounting of ‘material footprint, 
material footprint per capital, material footprint per GDP’. 
In contrast to calculations of domestic material consump-
tion (DMC), material footprint captures consumption of raw 
materials in other countries through international supply 
chains, and is thus essential for understanding transbound-
ary impacts (Wiedmann et al. 2015). A 2018 SDG imple-
mentation report card refers to these impacts as ‘spillovers’ 
through which wealthy countries are undermining other 
countries’ efforts to achieve the SDGs. It lists SDG 12 as one 
of two areas in which OECD countries are experiencing the 
greatest compliance gap, noting that many ‘are stagnating or 
experiencing a degradation…partly driven by the relatively 
high spillover effects embodied in trade ….’ (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, SDSN 2018).
It is estimated that two-fifths of global raw materials are 
extracted solely for exports, with the flow of these materi-
als generally traveling from developing to developed coun-
tries (Wiedmann et al. 2015, pp 6272–6273). This means 
that developed countries are able to outsource environmen-
tally harmful practices to developing countries. A World 
Resources Institute report on the implementation of SDGs 
by OECD countries echoed these findings, concluding that:
…gap analyses pointed to problem areas, including 
recognition that countries’ environmental perfor-
mance cannot be evaluated without examining the 
impacts created by importing resource-intensive goods 
(O’Connor 2016, p. 2).
Table 1  German Federal Government, German Sustainable Development Strategy (2016), 241
No. Indicator field sustainability postulate Indicators Targets
SDG 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
12.1.a Sustainable consumption
Making consumption environmentally 
and socially compatible
Market share of goods certified by independently verified sustainability 
labelling schemes (future perspective: market share of products and 
services with trustworthy and ambitious eco- and social labels)
34% by 2030
12.1.b Energy consumption and  CO2 emissions from consumption Continuous 
reduction of 
energy con-
sumption
12.2 Sustainable production
Increasing the proportion of sustainable 
production
EMAS eco-management 5000 organisa-
tion locations 
by 2030
1 https ://www.gov.uk/gover nment /publi catio ns/imple menti ng-the-
susta inabl e-devel opmen t-goals /imple menti ng-the-susta inabl e-devel 
opmen t-goals .
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Despite the importance of spillovers to the successful 
achievement of SDG 12, accounting for transboundary 
impacts does not comprise a formal element of countries’ 
SDG 12 strategies. In contrast, the 2017 High-Level Politi-
cal Forum on Sustainable Development found that reporting 
on SDG 12 had a domestic focus (United Nations 2017, p. 
12). A qualitative review of recent implementation strate-
gies echoes this finding. There are uneven approaches with 
a number of G20 countries failing to address entirely, or only 
on a limited basis, the transboundary impacts of domestic 
consumption (Table 2).
As this table shows, the EU and some Member States are 
participating in cooperative approaches through high-level 
institutional fora, MEAs and commitments to development 
assistance to achieve greener production. These dimensions 
are also represented in the SDG 12 sub-indicators, which 
include ‘number of parties to international environmental 
agreements on hazardous waste’ (12.4.1) and ‘amount of 
support for developing countries …for environmentally 
sound technologies’ (12.a.1).
However, they have neglected to employ adequate report-
ing. The EU strategy calls for ‘sustainable and responsible’ 
supply chains. A recent EU statistical analysis claims ‘sig-
nificant progress’ in decoupling environmental impacts from 
economic growth, as DMC has reduced by 16.8% between 
2007 and 2017, but acknowledges that ‘…DMC does not 
include ‘hidden’ raw material flows, which are required to 
generate imports or exports but are not part of the imported 
and exported raw materials and products’ (Eurostat 2018, 
p 2, 4–5). Thus, it fails to fulfil the reporting requirements 
proscribed in SDG 12.
Interactions between SDG 12 and other 
environmentalSDGs
The failure to account for transboundary impacts of domes-
tic consumption leads consuming countries to undermine 
the achievement of other SDGs. There is a growing body 
of academic literature which documents the environmental 
impacts of international supply chains (connecting these to 
the need for a more robust approach to the SDGs, see e.g. 
Wiedmann and Lenzen 2018). For illustrative purposes, 
a recent study which traced the supply chains for soy and 
palm in Germany concluded that the “Germany’s total con-
sumption-based demand…is almost twice as large as the 
direct physical imports listed in conventional trade statistics” 
and this external area is about 20% of Germany’s domestic 
cropland (Dawkins et al. 2016). It concluded that the areas 
which produce soy to be exported from Brazil to Germany 
are water scarce and German imports are potentially worsen-
ing the situation.
Partly driven by demand for biodiesel, which ostensibly 
fulfils climate change mitigation goals, in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, forest is being cleared both legally and illegally 
to sell timber and make way for agricultural land for palm oil 
plantations. This has greatly reduced numbers of orangutan 
and other species (Voight et al. 2018). The draining of peat 
bogs to make way for palm oil, and the burning of virgin 
forest, has also led to vast amounts of trapped methane and 
carbon emissions being released into the environment. As 
a result, Indonesia is now the fifth largest global emitter of 
greenhouse gases (WRI 2018). Thus, consumption of palm 
oil in the EU is undermining Indonesia’s ability to meet SDG 
13, which calls for climate action, as well as SDG 15 on life 
on land, which requires halting biodiversity loss.
EU approaches to mitigating transboundary 
environmental harm: surveying the gaps
Beyond SDG 12, the EU employs a number of approaches, 
enacted through different fora, to address transboundary 
environmental impacts of its trade and commercial activi-
ties. These include trade restrictions through the imposition 
of EU environmental regulatory requirements on imported 
products, obligations to consult on, and prevent harm from, 
projects whose environmental impacts extend beyond 
national borders, sustainable development chapters in EU 
trade agreements and Sustainability Impact Assessment 
of Free Trade Agreements. As above, we do not document 
these systemically, but instead choose illustrative examples 
that highlight gaps and limitations.
Regulatory challenges: a case study
Whilst the EU requires that imported products meet its own 
regulatory requirements, its ability to monitor these require-
ments is more limited than for domestic producers. For 
example, in its Renewable Energy Directive of 2009, the EU 
has passed legislation specifically to mitigate problems with 
biofuels. EU biofuels sustainability criteria require that bio-
fuels are relatively efficient vis-à-vis fossil fuels, and restrict 
where they can be grown, precluding peatland and highly 
biodiverse areas (EU 2009).
Despite these requirements, illegal logging activity on 
high conservation lands has been reported among some of 
the industry’s major producers and suppliers to the EU mar-
ket, including the Duta Palma group (BBC News 2010) and 
Korindo (Guardian 2016). The Indonesian Biofuels Devel-
opment Board claims that new plantations will expand only 
onto unproductive land, which has been deforested and then 
abandoned. However, companies have a built-in incentive to 
deforest land, as they receive more money from selling the 
timber. The example illustrates that tracing the production 
 Sustainability Science
1 3
Table 2  SDG 12: recognition of transboundary impacts of domestic production and consumption in selected G20 countries
<https ://ec.europ a.eu/europ eaid/polic ies/susta inabl e-devel opmen t-goals _en>
HM Government, Industrial Strategy: Building a Britain fit for the future (2017)
The Federal Government, German Sustainable Development Strategy (2016)
Country/region SDG 12 strategic approach Domestic and/or transboundary impacts focus
European Union Mapping of EU policies related to SDG 12: Investment 
Plan for Europe, circular economy agenda, food waste, 
biodiversity policies and private sector development, 
including sustainable and responsible supply chains, pro-
moting transition to agreener economy in partner countries, 
implementation of multi-lateral environmental agreements 
by developing countries, and rules to combat illegal, unre-
ported and unregulated fishing
Focus on domestic role in achieving SDG 12; international 
cooperation; but methodology accounts only for domestic 
material consumption (‘DMC’)
UK Linked to Industrial Strategy, which responds to four ‘Grand 
Challenges’ including clean growth focusing on domestic 
construction and transport technology. There is no specific 
engagement with SDG 12
Domestic focus
Germany Emphasis on promotion in international forums. Part of 
High-Level Support Group (including Sweden, Brazil, 
Colombia, Tunisia, Liberia, South Africa, Tanzania, Timor-
Leste) to contribute to “rapid and ambitious implementa-
tion” of SDG goals at national and international level. 
Recognition of global responsibility and aiming to support 
partner countries with implementation of environmental 
and social standards, promotion of technology transfer with 
regard to sustainable consumption and production
Domestic and international focus
France International focus for SDGs generally. SDGs mapped onto 
existing public policies. SDG 12 focus on circular economy 
and responsible consumption and production. Interna-
tional focus on ‘social entrepreneurship’ and ‘solidarity 
economy’ programmes, e.g. agroecology in Madagascar
Predominantly domestic focus with recognition of role in 
international fora
Italy SDGs are mapped on to National Strategic Goals. SDG 12 is 
related to policies on biodiversity, sustainable management 
of natural resources, protection of cultural heritage, mini-
mising pollution, ‘promoting industrialisation domestically 
and industrial share in developed countries’, promoting cor-
porate social and environmental responsibility, sustainable 
tourism, reducing waste, sustainable food production and 
supply chains, increasing energy efficiency and renewables
Domestic focus
Russian Federation No specific consideration of meeting of SDG 12. Sustainable 
development strategy in progress. Recognition of role as 
‘global contributor’ of energy and natural resources
–
China Focus on China’s role in global production and consumption 
and its environmental impacts with reference to ‘green’ 
national legislation and policy
Recognition of domestic consumption and production and 
global trade
India Mapped to government and sub-national strategies. Report of 
2017 did not consider SDG 12
–
United States No recent strategy or review. Previously linked to domestic 
policies on sustainable manufacturing, energy, water qual-
ity, sustainable agriculture and ecosystems with domestic 
and international focus. International programmes and 
agencies promoting sustainable development and consump-
tion, e.g. Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate, assistance and aid, partnerships with develop-
ing countries
–
Canada SDG 12 is linked to the Government’s Clean Growth 
Strategy, public procurement, sustainable forestry, mining, 
chemical and hazardous waste management policies, zero 
waste and circular economy strategies and strategies for cit-
ies. The global perspective is referred to in relation to G7, 
G20, OECD and other international commitments
Domestic and recognition of role in international fora
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process of manufactured goods is complex; where environ-
mental laws are being contravened, producers and suppli-
ers may actively conspire to shield corruption and illegal 
resource extraction from view. Whilst EU Member States 
have to submit reporting and undergo monitoring by the 
EU Commission to ensure they are implementing the EU’s 
Renewable Energy Directive, including its sustainability cri-
teria, its oversight of the production conditions in exporting 
countries is less intensive (Lydgate 2012b).
Further, the introduction of environmentally motivated 
regulatory requirements (such as EU biofuels sustainability 
criteria) complicates the free movement of goods and ser-
vices. The EU’s practice of conditioning imports on meeting 
regulatory criteria that intrude deep into foreign production 
processes has been criticised as a strategy to protect domes-
tic producers from cheaper imported products, or ‘green 
protectionism’, in the area of biofuels and beyond (Erixon 
2012). In the context of ongoing Doha ‘development’ Round 
negotiations of the WTO, as well as international environ-
mental negotiations dating back to the 1972 Stockholm 
Convention, developing countries have consistently raised 
concerns that attempts to apply domestic regulatory require-
ments to impose environmental or social welfare criteria that 
govern the way that products are produced infringes upon 
economic self-determination (Lydgate 2018).2
As well as EU regulatory restriction, the private sector 
has developed approaches to limit environmental harms. An 
examination of initiatives focused on the private sector is 
beyond the scope of this article, but bears brief consideration 
here as reliance on voluntary, market-driven approaches has 
also formed a component of some countries’ SDG strategies. 
As noted above, Germany has made indicator-specific com-
mitments to implementing the SDGs which constitute one of 
the most robust approaches within the EU. With respect to 
SDG 12, its targets include a commitment for 34 per cent of 
products to be certified by independent sustainability label-
ling schemes by 2030 (German Federal Government 2016). 
As this requirement will presumably encompass imported 
products as well, it comprises a transboundary approach. 
Yet voluntary labelling schemes are not comprehensive in 
their coverage.
In this case, to respond to concerns about rampant defor-
estation, as well as human rights abuses, consortia of stake-
holders, such as NGOs, palm oil producers, and government 
representatives, have formed sustainability certification 
schemes including the Round Table on Sustainable Palm 
Oil (‘RSPO’). In 2017, 20 per cent of palm oil was cer-
tified as sustainable (Carlson et al. 2018). Increasing the 
percentage of certified palm oil would aid in reducing nega-
tive transboundary impacts. However, a recent study showed 
that this voluntary, private-sector driven approach in itself 
was insufficient to lessen the development of peatland in the 
absence of monitoring and regulatory restrictions (Carlson 
et al. 2018).
FTAs
Since 2008, the EU has included sustainable development 
chapters in its trade agreements, which pertain directly to 
transboundary supply chains as they set out commitments for 
all Parties not to weaken environmental and labour protec-
tion in order to benefit trade and investment (Berger et al. 
2017). As EU FTAs concern only those states party to the 
agreement, they provide a more targeted opportunity to pur-
sue harmonisation and cooperation on environmental protec-
tion goals than does the multilateral forum of the WTO. The 
EU has adopted an approach often characterised as ‘soft’ or 
‘cooperative’, as it focuses on facilitating and formalising 
dialogue between governments and civil society. For exam-
ple, though such agreements call upon countries to enforce 
their environmental laws, if one party claims another has 
derogated from its environmental laws, this cannot be pur-
sued through the main dispute settlement mechanism of the 
<https ://www.gouve rneme nt.fr/en/susta inabl e-devel opmen t>
République France, Report on the Implementation by France of the Sustainable Development Goals (2016)
Italian Ministry for Environment, Land and Sea, Voluntary National Review Italy. National Sustainable Development Strategy (2017)
<http://ac.gov.ru/en/event s/01561 7.html>
Report on implementing the principles of sustainable development in the Russian Federation. Russian outlook on the new paradigm for sustain-
able development (Moscow 2012) <https ://susta inabl edeve lopme nt.un.org/conte nt/docum ents/1043n atrep eng.pdf>
<http://www.cn.undp.org/conte nt/china /en/home/susta inabl e-devel opmen t-goals /goal-12-respo nsibl e-consu mptio n-and-produ ction .html>
India, Voluntary National Review Report. On the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (2017)
United States of America National Report. Transport, chemicals, waste management, mining and sustainable consumption and production 
(2010) <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_ni/ni_pdfs/Natio nalRe ports /usa/Full_text.pdf>
Government of Canada, Canada’s Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Voluntary National Review (2018)
Table 2  (continued)
2 Note that this issue has also arisen consistently in major interna-
tional environmental negotiations, such as during the Earth Summit 
and (more recently) the Rio + 20 negotiations..
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agreements. These limitations reflect that the overarching 
aim of these agreements is to facilitate trade (Marx et al. 
2016). If located in the wider context of the trade v environ-
ment debate, the EU’s soft approach can also be seen as 
responding to a core concern that the imposition of binding 
sustainable development commitments through bi/multilat-
eral trade agreements will frustrate the ability to conclude 
FTAs, particularly with developing states, as such require-
ments will be perceived as excessively intrusive (Ellison 
2014). This charge cannot be levied against the EU’s facili-
tative sustainable development chapters. But the example 
also highlights the limits to which the law can affect change 
without a corresponding political desire to see the expansion 
of international trade coupled with a genuine commitment to 
ensuring that that trade has a minimal environmental impact.
Given the identified gaps in information and reporting, an 
approach that is potentially more broadlyuseful to assessing 
transboundary environmental harm is the EU’s practice of 
Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) of FTAs. The objec-
tive of SIA is to enable negotiators to agree ‘better’ FTAs. It 
does so by providing negotiators with information, compris-
ing both expert analysis and extensive stakeholder engage-
ment, about the likely impacts of the proposed agreement, 
thereby enabling them to make optimal decisions regarding 
trade-offs between different policy objectives (European 
Commission 2016). SIA in its current form is far too lim-
ited in scope to support the full achievement of SDG 12. The 
reason for this is twofold. First, the SIA is only concerned 
with the specific provisions of the FTA in question; not the 
impacts of a state’s wider trade and non-trade policy frame-
work. It will therefore fail to take account of other factors 
that affect the resource-efficiency of traded products. Sec-
ond, an SIA will only cover forecasted impacts of increased 
trade within and between parties to the FTA. Impacts in third 
party countries, even those that are a direct consequence of 
the FTA, will not be addressed. A useful illustration of this 
is provided by the EU’s SIA on CETA, the trade agreement 
between the EU and Canada:
Regarding nickel, aluminium and lead products, the EU 
will substitute decreasing Canadian production of these 
materials with imports from third countries… Therefore, 
in these countries, the CETA will contribute to accelerated 
depletion of metal mineral resources in addition to water and 
air pollution due to the highly polluting production processes 
for these materials. (Kirkpatrick et al. 2011, p 204).
Little consideration is given in the SIA to how these envi-
ronmental impacts in third countries might be mitigated. 
Had these impacts been identified in either the EU or Can-
ada, the EU’s SIA framework would have required mitiga-
tion measures to be identified by the SIA consultants so that 
they could be considered for inclusion in the final agree-
ment. There is clearly a need for SIA-style analysis of trade 
impacts to take place on a broader and more comprehensive 
scale. This would also respond to another core, but oppos-
ing concern, in trade v environment discourse to that set out 
above, namely that sustainable development discourse has 
resulted in the environment being neglected in the formula-
tion of trade policy (Ross-Robertson 2003).
Espoo Convention/Kyiv Protocol
The Stockholm Declaration, one of the founding instru-
ments of modern international environmental law, recom-
mends that countries prevent transboundary harm by agree-
ing international conventions to undertake transboundary 
impact assessment (Stockholm Declaration 1972, Principle 
21). The EU has fulfilled this commitment through both its 
internal environmental assessment legislation and its com-
mitment to the 1991 UNECE Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment (the Espoo Convention 1991); EU Mem-
ber States form the majority of participants. This requires 
states to notify others if certain types of actions may affect 
them (Article 3) and then, after conducting an environmen-
tal impact assessment, enter consultations with potentially 
impacted states. These consultations may relate to alterna-
tives to the proposed activity, mitigation measures, monitor-
ing of impacts and providing support to affected states in 
dealing with any impacts (Article 5).
EU countries have deepened this commitment through the 
2003 Strategic Environmental Assessment Protocol encom-
passing EU and Eastern European Partnership countries 
which obligates them to undertake strategic environmental 
assessment of their ‘plans and programmes’, including their 
transboundary impacts (Kyiv Protocol 2003, Article 10). In 
both cases, the coverage excludes the assessment of trade 
policies. In practice, the utilisation of both treaties has been 
limited. The most recent Meeting of Parties of Espoo, for 
example, noted that there was no standardised approach to 
organising transboundary consultations and only a minority 
of Parties included in legislation the obligation to provide 
information to concerned Parties (UNECE 2013–15).
International environmental law: limits 
of the obligation to prevent transboundary 
harm
The obligation to prevent transboundary harm has been 
described as ‘the cornerstone of international environmen-
tal law’ (Sands 1995, p. 186), and is widely recognised as 
a customary norm of international law. It includes a duty to 
prevent, reduce and control environmental harm resulting 
from activities within a state’s control, and a duty to cooper-
ate in mitigating transboundary environmental risk through 
notification, consultation, and in some cases, environmental 
impact assessment (Birnie et al. 2009, p 137).
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It should be noted that the label of ‘no harm’ is somewhat 
misleading. States are not prohibited from taking or permit-
ting actions that harm the environment outside their borders. 
Rather, these rules amount to an obligation of due diligence, 
i.e. states are required to take reasonable steps to prevent 
such harm (Knox 2002, p 293). This suggests an obligation 
for EU to take reasonable steps to ensure that its domestic 
consumption is not degrading the environments of other 
countries, rather than to prevent such actions altogether.
In international disputes, findings of transboundary harm 
have focused primarily on cross-border contamination, such 
as water or air-borne pollution (International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) 2010 or environmental degradation in contested 
territory (ICJ 2018), rather than harm resulting from supply 
chains. However, the expansion of international trade means 
that transboundary impacts have become more widespread 
and complex than ever before. This suggests the need for 
greater formal recognition that the ‘no harm’ obligation 
should also apply here. For example, that the EU, in its 
CETA SIA, identified likely negative impacts in other states 
as a result of its trade policy but has not taken steps to miti-
gate these suggests that they have fallen below the requisite 
standard of preventing transboundary harm.
As well as contravening this obligation, this approach 
is contrary to one of the basic principles of environmental 
justice, that the costs and benefits of environmental harms 
are distributed fairly across society, in this case the global 
society (Schlosberg 2007, chapter 2). Issues of responsibil-
ity and fair distribution have proven contentious through-
out the history of environmental treaty-making (Mickelson 
2015), and are particularly vexed in this context. The law of 
state responsibility requires that the state in which the harm 
originated bears the responsibility to redress this harm. In 
this instance, redressing an environmental harm could be 
achieved through restricting trade, or imposing additional 
onerous regulatory restrictions, that would hamper the devel-
opment of export markets. Such solutions bring into conflict 
the economic development and environmental conservation 
‘pillars’ of sustainable development. Regulatory oversight 
by states of foreign natural resource management also risks 
violating the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, i.e. the right of states to freely determine how they 
utilise resources found within their jurisdiction (although 
see recent decisions that suggest that this right is now quali-
fied by an obligation of sustainable use, for example Court 
of Arbitration 2013, para. 111–112). Expanding regulatory 
requirement to trace the impacts of trade on environmental 
protection is also likely to prove costly and complex, and 
risks coming into conflict with legal obligations imposed 
by the World Trade Organization  and FTAs, including the 
foundational non-discrimination principle of treating prod-
ucts evenly, with respect to regulation, regardless of origin 
(Lydgate 2018).
Preventing environmental harm 
through supply chains: addressing the gaps
Methodologically, current assessment of transboundary 
trade impacts only applies in a narrow set of situations, 
as identified above. These are supplemented by MEAs 
that restrict trade for a narrow set of purposes, such as 
controlling the movement of extremely harmful products 
under the Basel Convention on the Control of Transbound-
ary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 
(Basel Convention), and protecting species threatened with 
extinction by international trade under the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).
This leaves a large gap. However, a cross-cutting theme 
of this analysis is the concern that strengthening obliga-
tions to prevent environmental harm on a transboundary 
basis will infringe upon sovereignty or restrict economic 
development in exporting countries. There is certainly 
scope for progress in a way that circumvents these politi-
cal concerns.
First, there is ample room for improvement simply 
through pursuing, and making accessible, more informa-
tion about the international impacts of trade. One obvi-
ous way to do this is to include transboundary impacts in 
SDG 12 reporting. Given the complexity of global supply 
chains, simply understanding potential impacts of chang-
ing trade patterns is not always straightforward. Whilst 
various actors aim to document these impacts, adopting 
a systematicapproach of national reporting would greatly 
further these efforts. Alarmingly, the 2018 High-Level 
Political Forum report on SDG 12 noted that it is the ‘least 
resourced’ of all of the SDGs (HLPF 2018, p. 3). Further 
funding would help with the development of more effec-
tive assessment of transboundary impacts.
Second, the EU has developed procedural mecha-
nisms, notably SIA, that aim to further understanding of 
how trade impacts upon other dimensions of sustainable 
development. That it concerns impacts in all states party 
to an FTA, not just those internal to the EU, means that 
SIA has the potential to provide a transboundary perspec-
tive on the implementation of both SDG 12 and the wider 
SDG agenda. Building on the EU approach to stakeholder 
engagement under SIA would be a positive first step in 
this regard.
EU Member States also participate in the Espoo Con-
vention and its SEA Protocol, which require impact assess-
ment of transboundary harms that may result from certain 
projects, plans and programmes. Like SIA, SEA and EIA 
have also been subject to criticism for neglecting to require 
mitigation measures to respond to harms. The Espoo Con-
vention, for example, only requires that ‘due account’ is 
taken of the environmental impact assessment and the 
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results of the consultations (Article 6). This is one of the 
main criticisms of environmental assessment generally 
(Holder 2004, p 235), and has been noted in relation to 
international environmental impact assessment specifically 
(Craik 2008, p 72–73).
However, culture theories of environmental assessment 
suggest that by requiring decision-makers to systemati-
cally consider the environmental impacts of proposed pro-
jects and policies, environmental assessment obligations 
will, over time, achieve an ecologisation of the institutions 
responsible for environmental decision-making (Bartlett 
2005). It is possible to see environmental impact assess-
ment as an institutional learning process. That is, consid-
eration of the environment will become self-evidently nec-
essary without the need for legislative prompts. Improved 
EIA therefore has the potential to deliver a gradual shift 
towards a more environmentally aware trade practice. Ulti-
mately, this can bring about a better balance between the 
environmental, social welfare and economic development 
pillars of sustainable development. Providing develop-
ment assistance for countries to conduct domestic envi-
ronmental impact assessment is an approach that the EU is 
currently pursuing with its Eastern European Partnership 
countries in the framework of the Espoo Convention, and 
which could be expanded.
Notification and consultation are not the only obliga-
tions that could be imposed on negotiating states. It is pos-
sible to go further and argue that states must not only be 
required to consult on mitigatory measures but implement 
such measures. It is of course hoped that some form of 
mitigation is pursued following consultation, but it should 
be noted that few impact assessment regimes impose sub-
stantive obligations to mitigate potential negative impacts. 
An obligation to consult should not be conflated with an 
obligation to respond. In the context of a transboundary 
approach, however, there are advantages to limiting obli-
gations to notification and consultation only. This would 
go some way in answering concerns about potential vio-
lation of the ‘no harm’ rule, and also provide countries 
the opportunity to adopt their own mitigatory measures, 
without imposing any burden that may fatally frustrate a 
cooperative approach to SDG 12 implementation.
These recommendations have some relevance to the 
broader goal of transformative SDG implementation, as 
they address overall gaps in rigorous use of targets and 
reporting, addressing interactions between goals, and 
thinking of the goals on a global, transboundary basis, 
rather than simply as domestic objectives. Yet ultimately, 
the manner through which SDG 12 will be implemented 
is a political decision for states and the success of the 
SDG agenda relies as much on a wider cultural shift away 
from excessive consumption patterns as it does on techni-
cal legal reform.
Conclusion
The failure to account for transboundary environmental 
harm in the SDG 12 context has a troubling implication 
with respect to the balance between the pillars of sustain-
able development: environmental concerns remain subor-
dinate to the imperative of increasing free trade. Assessing 
trade policies in terms of their environmental, rather than 
economic, impacts will be necessary to fully redress this 
shortcoming and its implied hierarchy between the pillars. 
Trade has complex impacts and implications, and taking 
account of them necessarily involves considering the rela-
tionships between different, at times competing, but equally 
legitimate goals, a balancing process that can be approached 
through policy tools including impact assessment. Here we 
have argued that approaches which require the imposition 
of additional trade restrictions are politically unpalatable as 
they hamper export markets, thus pitting ‘environment’ and 
‘development’ against one another. Instead, we have focused 
on the importance of more, and better, information to make 
transparent transboundary environmental harm through 
trade: information to bring about transformation.
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